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Introduction:

It was over 190 years before the first woman sat on the Supreme Court of the United
States of America. Today, three women sit on the high court. Does the gender of Supreme
Court justices impact their decision-making? This research seeks to answer that question
through both a quantitative and qualitative examination of Supreme Court decisions. Through
reading Supreme Court decisions authored by both men and women and running statistical
analyses on these Court decisions, I have been able to uncover whether or not gender has an
effect on the decisions Justices make.
As the number of women on the Court grows, more and more opportunities are created
to study the possible effects on gender on Supreme Court decisions. Yet, researchers have not
reached one consensus on how significant gender may be on decisions making. This is due,
in part, to competing theoretical models. Researchers and theorists studying gender seem to
fall within one of three different models on the effect of gender: the conventional or
attitudinal model, the different voice model, or the gendered or representative voice model.
This paper seeks to test the impact of gender on Supreme Court behavior. I utilize both
qualitative and quantitative approaches and discover that gender does matter along with other
factors. Simply put, at times, Justices O'Connor and Ginsberg behave in a manner different
than their male counterparts controlling for ideology, gender, and case factors such as legal
issues and case facts.
Existing Models of Judicial Behavior:

Scholarship in political science posits two primary models ofjudicial decision
mak.ing, the legal and the attitudinal model. The legal model is a model of legal determinism
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where the law drives judicial behavior. Under the legal model, judges play the role of mere
facilitators or voices for what the law ''is". Applied to gender and decision-making, this
models holds that judicial choice will not be affected by gender. Men and women will simply
follow the law and nothing else. Years of scholarship in political science and the legal
realism movement in legal scholarship, show that the legal model assumes too much about the
authority of law and the willingness of judges and justices to follow it. The attitudinal model
incorporates human nature into the decision-making process. It holds that judges and justices
do not simply follow the law. Instead, they use their ideology to make decisions based on
their political preferences. Justices and justices are either liberal or conservative and that
ideology and little else drive their behavior. For the attitudinal model, if gender impacts
ideology, then gender matters. That is, if gender matters it only matters, then it only matters
because it has a common impact on the development of ideology in men and women. Given
the limitations of these two general models, feminist and non-feminist scholars interested in
gender and judging have developed other gender specific models to explain political and
judicial choice. These models include the conventional, different voice and representative
voice models.
The conventional model believes that gender has no effect on Court decisions. This
model holds that male and female justices will behave the exact same ways and that either law
or ideology motivates them. The ultimate conclusion is that men and women are not different
when making judicial decisions. Thus, the conventional model is consistent with both the
legal and attitudinal models. In their article "Making a Difference: Women in the Judiciary",
Elaine Martin and Barry Pyle write, "The most conservative, and perhaps the most common,
conventional view is that women judges and men judges will come to essentially the same

2

conclusions in law" (Martin and Pyle 256). In this manner, the conventional model is
consistent with the legal model. Judges are simply applying the law, which has one meaning,
to the facts in front of them. Martin and Pyle write about this as well, saying "the
conventional legal model is closely related to the traditional belief that law is objective and
that judges merely find rather than make law" (Martin and Pyle 256). Barbara Palmer in her
article '"To Do Justly': The Integration of Women into the American Judiciary"
acknowledges that a lot of the research focused on the effects, or lack thereof, of women in
the judiciary has focused on Sandra Day O'Connor, as she was the first woman to sit on the
Supreme Court. Palmer writes "others have argued...there is very little evidence that Justice
O'Connor speaks in [a] different voice" (Palmer 237). This conventional model of thinking,
that men and women are the same, may not be entirely accurate. The attitudinal model helps
to explain what we actually see in judicial decision making slightly more, since it
acknowledges that there are times where men and women will make different decisions. But,
these differences are not due to gender, and instead are caused by something else, most often
explained by political ideology that might be influenced by gender. Martin and Pyle describe
this way of thinking when they write, "this next generation of judicial decision-making
scholarship... concentmted on the psychological and the purely political aspect of how judges
acquired their judicial preferences through socialization and the influences of their personal
backgrounds and characteristics. Objective studies of such features as the justices' partisan
affiliations, prior career patterns, and religion have shown them to be important variables in
explaining judicial decision-making ... Political views and attitudes replace the law as the
primary factor in decision-making" (Martin and Pyle 257). These models assume that judges
are either completely separate from any type of external influence (the conventional model),
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or that the only way in which they can possibly be influenced is through their political
ideology (the attitudinal model). This straightforward approach fails to recognize the
complex systems at work within people that influence every decision they make. Other
models present in the research on gender and judicial decisions making do a better job of
acknowledging that things around them and the things that they have experienced impact
everyone, judges included. All told, the conventional model merely assumes that men and
women are the same. It's all about attitudes or the law.
The second model, the different voice theory, acknowledges that men and women
have experienced life differently. Martin and Pyle use an example centered around Justice
Ginsberg, the second woman to sit on the Supreme Court, to discuss how men and women
experience life differently. They write "When U.S. Supreme Court Justice Ginsberg went to
law school in the 1950's there were only nine women in her class more than five hundred.
She recalls the Dean of Harvard Law holding a reception for those nine women, and then
asking them one by one to explain what they were doing at the law school occupying a seat
that could have been filled by a man" (Martin and Pyle 259). In their article "Women and
Men Policymakers: Does the Judge's Gender Affect the Sentencing of Criminal
Defendants?", Darrell Steffensmeier and Chris Hebert label these people who subscribe to the
different voice model as "maximalists". They define this group as believing that "sexes are
fundamentally different cognitively, emotionally, and behaviorally as a result of the
interaction of biological, psychological, and experiential realities of being male or female"
(Steffensmeier and Herbert 1165). The different voice theorists believe that men and women
will behave differently regardless of the issue they approach because they are different
people. They have experienced different things and see the world in different ways and this
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difference goes beyond ideology. Susan B. Haire and Laura P. Moyer talk about this
difference in their book Diversity Matters: Judicial Policy Making in the U.S. Court of
Appeals. They write "[women's] shared experiences with differential treatment in law school
and their legal profession had a profound effect, for many, in shaping their perspectives on
being a . . . judge" (Haire and Moyer 36). On this topic, Martin and Pyle say "It is important to
understand that this different voice is defined as afeminine voice, not afeminist voice"
(Martin and Pyle 258). This means that the different voice of women will persist across any
issue in front of them, regardless of their ideology. They will always see things and think
about things differently than their male counterparts with similar ideological perspectives. On
the contributions female justices make to the Court, Martin and Pyle write, "One way in
which...differences could emerge is with women judges providing a counterbalance to male
dominated perspectives. Feminist legal scholars contend that the law itself is male. That is,
that the legal system, the legal language and style of legal reasoning used to support the law
have historically been founded on the basis of the life experiences and values of privileged,
educated white men. Furthermore, these are the same men who have administered and
interpreted the law in its application to women" (Martin and Pyle 261). However, the final
model disagrees with this assessment of how gender affects judicial decision-making.
Some researchers believe that there are certain issues or areas of the law around which
women will speak up with a gendered voice different than that of their male colleagues, and
they belong to the third model of thinking, the gendered-representative voice model. This
may occur for many reasons. There may be certain issues around which women feel more
comfortable speaking, or issues around which they have knowledge that is different from
male judges. The female justices themselves have discussed this. Justice Ginsberg heard, in
5

her time on the Court, a case dealing with the experiences of a young girl. Savana Redding
was a 1 3-year-old middle school student when she was accused of possessing pills in
violation of the school's drug policy. When she denied that the pills were hers, the assistant
principle ordered a strip search. Justice Ginsberg spoke about this case to the media. When
discussing the male judges and their understanding of the case, she said "They have never
been a 13-year-old girl. It's a very sensitive age for a girl. I don't think that my colleagues,
some of them, quite understood" (Martin and Pyle 255). Or it may be that women feel
obligated to stick up for other women and to represent them. Martin and Pyle discuss a
plethora of research pointing to specific issues around which women and men behave
differently. "More recent research studies suggest that there may be some gender effects as
they relate to some specific issues and decision-making contexts. For example, Allen and
Wall found that women on state supreme courts are more likely to than men to be the most
pro-female members of their court on women's issues...McCall finds that women side with
defendants in police brutality cases ...An analysis of gay rights reveals that women are more
supportive regardless of party and a variety of other control variables" (Martin and Pyle 260).
Palmer also talks about this in her article, where she looks at the impact of increasing the
number of women judges. She believes, based on other research, that it does in one particular
area. She talks about this, saying "There is a general consensus that [women's] impact is
greatest in one particular area oflaw: sex discrimination" (Palmer 237). It is that are of the
law that was examined in this research to look for the possibility of that gendered
representative voice. Yet, this research also takes into account other factors, such as political
ideology. Gender cannot be looked at in a vacuum and all possible explanations of different
decision making between men and women must be examined.
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The above description of the models can be used to create a series of expectations.
These are presented in the figure below.
Figure 1: Models and Expectations
Legal Model

The type of law and the facts of the case are
the only things that matter.

Attitudinal Model

Political ideology is the only thing that
matters.
The law may matter and ideology may
matter, but gender does not matter.

Conventional Model
Different Voice Model

Gender is the only thing that matters.
Women will behave differently regardless
of ideology.

Representative Voice Model

Gender, ideology, and case facts all matter
because each variable will have a different
impact in different types of cases.

Beyond the Empirical Question:
If men and women behave differently, then it is clear that female representation on the
Court matters. If women have a different perspective that leads to different decisions, then
those perspectives and decisions have a place on the Court. Diverse opinions and discussions
are what lead to the best judicial and decisions and legal interpretations. But if men and
women act the same way, female representation still matters. Even ifthere is absolutely no
difference in the way genders behave and make judicial decisions, representation is still
important. Women make up over half of the population and they deserve to have equal
representation in all places of society, including the legal system. Individuals going before
the Court should be able to see people that look like them on the bench in front of them, and
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that includes women. Female representation is also important for the socialization of young
girls. We can't expect young children and girls to become involved in the legal system if they
never see themselves represented. Regardless of the outcome of research on the effects of
gender on Court decisions, we should always be striving for more diverse and equal
representation in the judiciary.
Methodology:

The results of this research will be able to tell us what factors matter in judicial
decision-making and how much they matter. If it is found that only politically ideology is
statistically significant, then that means that decisions will be driven solely due to political
ideology. Gender will not matter. If only gender is statistically significant, on the other hand,
then gender matters in judicial decision-making and political ideology does not. However, it
is possible that both gender and political ideology are statistically significant. that they both
matter. If this is the case, it is possible that political ideology matters more, and has a greater
impact, than does gender. And vice versa. It is my hypothesis that gender will matter in
judicial decision making, but that it will be not matter as much as a justice's political
ideology. I expect whether a justice is conservative or liberal will drive their decisions more
than their gender. But, consistent with representative voice, gender will matter with some
issues heard by the Court, though not all.
I decided to focus my research on sex discrimination cases under the fourteenth
amendment's equal protection clause. If there is going to be a difference in the way in which
men and women undergo judicial decision-making, previous research tells us it is most likely
to be found in these types of cases. I performed a general search on Westlaw for cases
dealing with gender and discrimination. I then searched the case database Oyez for the same
8

thing. After I cross-examined these two lists I had over 90 cases dealing with gender
discrimination. Because this research examines the behavior of women on the Court, who
were not represented for most of the Court's history, I narrowed down the cases I would
examine to those that occurred after 1971. That was the year the Court heard Reed v. Reed,
404 U.S. 71 ( 1971 ), a turning point for the Court that began their serious treatment of equal
protection cases. In total I examined fifty-five Supreme Court cases and 492 individual
justice votes. After I had a set of cases, I needed to get them in a format in which they could
be analyzed by STATA, the analyses software that I used.
Coding was done under the guidance and with the assistance of Dr. Pyle. When
coding, every aspect of a case is called a variable, and each variable is assigned a value. I
coded two different types of data: court data and individual data. Court data included all
information pertaining to a case on a court level. Once this data was collected, I broke it
down by individual justice for the individual level data. The Court data set includes 56 cases
and 33 variables with 1,848 individual data points. The individual level data includes 490
votes of the individual justices. This data set has 50 variables to create 24,500 data points for
analysis.
Once data sets were created, I used STATA to create logit models and conditional
effect probabilities. Martin and Pyle discuss logit models in their article "Gender, Race, and
Partisanship on the Michigan Supreme Court". They write "Logit analysis is appropriate
when the dependent variable is dichotomous" (Martin and Pyle 1226). In this data, the
dichotomous dependent variable is the outcome of cases. They are coded as one of two
things, and only one oftwo: For equality (1) or against it (0). Martin and Pyle continue,
saying "the logit model calculates the maximum likelihood estimators (MLE) or coefficients
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that indicate the direction and strength of the relationship between the dependent and an
independent variable, controlling for the influence of other independent variables" (Martin
and Pyle 2000). Coefficients, however, can only tell one so much, so you can use them to
calculate conditional effect probabilities tell you how much of an increase in the probability
of a decision for equality is there if a variable has a specific value.
De(!endent and lndeRendent Variables:

I started with the Court level data. I read every Court opinion to determine the date
the case was decided, the case name, its citation in the United States Reports, and the outcome
of the case. Outcome was scored one if the Court decided in favor of the individual or group
seeking the protection from sex discrimination. I also coded the legal doctrine used in the
decision, the number of justices in the majority opinion, the dissents, and the concurrence. A
majority opinion is when a justice writes the opinion of the Court, a concurrence is written
when a justice agrees with the outcome of the case, but not the rationale, or wants to add
something that is not in the majority opinion. A dissent is written by a justice who disagrees
with the outcome of a case. Next I measured the total number of dissents and concurrences
written, the number of women who heard the case, and the gender of the parties in the case.
Next I turned to the case issues and facts. I assessed whether the case dealt with equal
protection, due process, the military, family law, sexual harassment, retaliation, or was a
statutory issue, and, finally, whether or not the government was one of the parties in the case.
I followed a similar strategy when building the second data set. Individual data
includes all of the information pertaining to how the individual justices behaved. Cases were
read to determine which way each justice voted, what doctrine each justice used, whether they
wrote a majority, concurring, or dissenting opinion, and whether or not they joined in
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another's majority, concurring, or dissenting opinion. I also made sure to include what the
Martin-Quinn score was for each justice during the year the case decided. Martin-Quinn
scores are a way to measure a justice's political ideology (Martin and Quinn 2002; Ho and
Quinn 2008). Positive numbers mark a justice as being conservative, while a negative
number identifies them as a liberal. The larger the positive number, the more conservative
they are and the larger a negative number, the more liberal. These scores are calculated for
each year a justice sits on the court, for political ideology is not a stable variable. Justices
can, and do, change their political ideology over time. Figure 2 is an example of three cases
partially coded for Court data and Figure 3 an example of coding partially done for individual
data.
A Note About the Scope of the Research:

This research deals with two women who have sat on the Supreme Court: Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor and Justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg. These are not the only two women
who have ever sat on the Court. We now have Justices Elena Kagan and Sonia Sotomayor.
However, the Court has not heard sex discrimination cases under the fourteenth amendment
since these two women have arrived on the bench. In order to understand how gender may
operate within Justice O'Connor and Justice Ginsberg, it is important to know a little bit about
each of them. Sandra Day O'Connor was nominated to the Court in 1 981 by President
Ronald Regan. She was known as a more conservative justice, with her average Martin
Quinn score for the cases that I analyzed being 1.08, marking her as a more moderate
conservative. Ruth Bader Ginsberg was nominated to the Court in 1993 by President Bill
Clinton. She is still one of the more liberal justices on the court. Her average Martin-Quinn
score for the cases I analyzed was -1.36, showing her as fairly liberal, yet not as liberal as
11

other justices who have sat on the Court. Reading opinions written by each of these women
helped me to be able to understand them a little bit better. Walking through the types of cases
they wrote on and what they were saying shows us what these women were thinking as they
were going through judicial decision making.

Qualitative Court Opinion Analysis:
One extremely well known case where the two women agreed was US v. Virginia,
518 U.S. 515 (1996). In this case, Justice Ginsberg wrote the majority opinion, which Justice
O'Connor joined. The Virginia Military Institute was a single sex school for men only.
Women brought suit claiming that the school was discriminating on the basis of sex in
violation of the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause. The Court of Appeals for
the lower Fourth Circuit ordered Virginia to remedy a constitutional violation, which they
attempted to do by proposing a parallel program for women, that is, a separate military school
for women only. The Supreme Court held that a parallel program did not remedy the
constitutional violation created by the gender discrimination. The admittance of only men
was found to be in violation of the equal protection clause, because Virginia was unable to
show an "exceedingly persuasive justification" for the discrimination. That "exceedingly
persuasive justification" was the standard of review the Court applied, in US v. Virginia, to
sex discrimination cases. A standard of review is a test the Court uses to determine if a
constitutional violation has occurred. Standards of review typically fall into one of three
categories" rational basis, where the discrimination need only be rationally related to some
type of interest, strict scrutiny, which means there must be a compelling a compelling interest
and the discrimination must be done by the least restrictive means possible, or intermediate
scrutiny, which is a test between rational basis and strict scrutiny. The "exceedingly
12

persuasive justification" test applied in US v. Virginia is a fonn of intermediate scrutiny.
Justice O'Connor joined Justice Ginsberg in this momentous decision.
Justice O'Connor and Justice Ginsberg do not always join together in all sex
discrimination cases, however. One such example of this is Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent
School District, 524 US 274 (1998). Here, Justice O'Connor wrote the majority opinion
while Justice Ginsberg dissented. A high school student was engaged in a sexual relationship
with her male teacher. When the two were discovered, the girl and her mother sued the
school district for damages, claiming that they had violated Title IX. The Court held that
damages could not be recovered unless a school district official who had the ability to institute
corrective measures on behalf of the district had notice of the conduct and failed to act, which
was not the case for Lago Vista Independent School District.
Just from an initial qualitative examination of Court opinions I was able to see the
impact of gender on Court doctrines. In Mississippi Universityfor Women v. Hogan, 458
U.S. 718 (1982), an adult male was denied admittance to the Mississippi University for
Women, who only admitted women into its School of Nursing. The man sued, claiming that
Mississippi University for Women was violating the equal protection clause by discriminating
against men. The Court held that such discrimination did in fact violate the equal protection
clause, but they did something more. They kept the same "exceedingly persuasive
justification" test they had previously used, but shifted the burden proof onto the proponent of
the discrimination. That is, the state, organization, or body attempting to discriminate now
had the burden to show that they had an exceedingly persuasive justification for
discriminating. This shift may seem like a small thing, but it makes it harder for bodies
attempting to discriminate to do so, because they now have a burden of proof they must meet
13

to allow their discrimination to stand. This case was decided in 1982, the year after Justice
O'Connor came onto the Court. In fact, she wrote the majority opinion in Mississippi
Universityfor Women v. Hogan. It's quite possible that it was the presence of Justice

O'Connor on the Court that created this shift in doctrine that made it more difficult for bodies
to discriminate on the basis of gender. This finding would support both the different voice
and representative voice models. It's clear that gender does matter somewhat, but it is unclear
from simply a qualitative examination if it is the only thing that matters, or if there are other
variables that are also in play.
Unfortunately, while qualitative analysis can tell us important information about a few
cases, the results are in the end anecdotal. Each of the cases addressed above are important
landmark decisions but there were 53 other cases. For that reason, I turned to a quantitative
analysis.
Statistical Analysis of Court Opinions:

So even from an examination of Court opinions and their contents, we can see that
there is a possibility of gender influencing Court decisions. Yet, we cannot say this for sure
based solely on qualitative data, which is why I next turned to statistical analysis. Because I
used two different data set types, I had two different types of statistical results: statistical
Court data and statistical individual data. In analyzing this data, I coded the outcome of a
case as either "for equality" or "against equality". An outcome of "for equality" means that
some kind of discrimination was found and held to be unconstitutional. Oftentimes, this is a
ruling for an individual. "Against equality" means that discrimination was upheld and
allowed to continue.
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One of the first things I looked at was whether there was an additive effect of gender
on the Court. If there is just one woman on the Court, they may feel uncomfortable speaking
up for women or may be influenced by the overwhelming majority of men on the Court.
However, if there are multiple women, it may be that women feel more comfortable speaking
up or more supported. In order to see if there was any validity to this hypothesis, I examined
the outcomes of cases when compared to the number of women on the Court. What I found
can be seen in Figure 4 (see Appendix 3). There is no difference in outcomes from simply
one woman being on the Court. This could mean that gender does not have a large impact on
Court decisions. However, when I looked at outcomes with two women on the Court,
O'Connor and Ginsberg, I could see a change. There were more outcomes "for equality"
when there are two women on the Court than when there are one or none at all. This helps to
validate the idea that women are more comfortable speaking up when there are multiple of
them on the Court, supporting the representative voice model. If gender was the only variable
that mattered, such as the different voice theory proposes, I should have seen a difference in
judicial decisions with just Justice O'Connor on the bench. However, this was not the case.
When both Justice O'Connor and Justice Ginsberg sat on the Court, outcomes were more
likely to expand individual liberties.
During my coding, I made sure to mark what type of issue a case was dealing with,
making differentiations between equal protection cases, Title IX cases, and Title VII cases.
Statutory cases are different than cases dealing with the equal protection clause because they
do not deal with a constitutional question. The Court is not being asked to interpret the
Constitution, merely to apply statutory law to a specific situation. When I separated out Title
IX cases and examined outcomes by gender, which can be found in Figure 5 (see Appendix
15

4), I saw no differences between men and women. They make decisions "for equality" at the
same rate as men. This would support the legal model, attitudinal model, or conventional
model, as all consider gender to not matter in judicial decision-making and I couldn't see any
differences between the way men and women behaved. This is not true for Title VII,
however. The breakdown of gender and outcomes for Title VII cases can be seen in Figure 6
(see Appendix 5). Male justices, when decided Title VII cases, actually make decisions
"against equality" more often than they vote "for equality". Women do not act the same way,
however. They vote "for equality" a lot more than they vote against it. This is quite a large
difference, supporting the representative voice model. It is clear that gender has an effect on
judicial decision making, but so does case type, since the results for Title VII and Title IX
cases were so different. One reason for this difference between Title VII and Title IX cases
may be that title IX cases are typically much more controversial. These are often cases
dealing with sexual harassment and very difficult topics. With Title IX, there is less
consensus which may explain why justices, both male and female, are deciding for and
against equality at about the same rate.
The final breakdown I did of Court level data before turning to individual decisions
and Court outcomes was to look at decisions dealing solely with equal protection cases. This
was one of the more interesting outcomes I saw, which can be seen in Figure 7 (see Appendix
6). Male justices act like they do in most other types of cases, ruling in favor of equality
slightly more often than they rule against it. But this is the only issue in which women
actually rule for and against equality at exactly the same rate, meaning that they rule for
equality less often than men, once again supporting the representative voice model.
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I also examined gender and Court outcomes, which can be seen in Figure 8 (see
Appendix 7). I examined the gender of the justices and the outcome of their decisions. This
where we can begin to see a real difference when we break down decisions by gender. Male
justices have outcomes "for equality" slightly more often that they have outcomes "against
equality". Yet, female justices have outcomes "for equality" far more often that they have
outcomes "against equality". While the statistical court data can tell us there is a difference
between the way men and women act, and while it may generally support the representative
voice model, what it can't tell us is whether or not those differences are actually caused by
gender. To examine that, I turned to individual data.
Because what I was dealing with was a dichotomous dependent variable, either an
outcome for or against equality (a 1 or a 0), I was able to use a logit model to predict the log
likelihood of either a zero or a one. The logit model, thus, is able to predict the outcome of
the case, that is, whether or not the outcome will be for or against equality. In order to
understand the results of the logit model, one does not necessarily need to understand the
math behind it. The logit model calculates maximum likelihood estimators (MLE's) that tell
us the direction and magnitude of the relationship between two variables, the dependent and
independent, controlling for other independent variables. The logit model can be seen in
Figure 9 (see Appendix 8). At the bottom of the table is the chi-square with a value of
124. 74. This number tells us that the model as a whole is statistically significant. Above the
chi-square is the rate of correct categorization, which is 72.4%. This means that the logit
model was able to correctly predict the outcome of 72.4% of the cases analyzed. That is a
very good rate of categorization. Directly below that number is the reduction of error, at
32.4%. In order to understand this percentage, we also need to discuss the mean of the
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dependent variable, which is .59, or 59%. From simply looking at the data set, we know that
there are more outcomes for equality than against it, that is more 1's than O's. If we were to
always choose 1 as the outcome of the case, because we know there are more of those, we
could be right 59% of the time. The logit model, however, has reduced that error by 32.4%
making it much more accurate.
A logit model also provides coefficients, marked on the table, and described earlier, as
maximum likelihood estimators. These can be difficult to interpret, but two things they can
tell us is the direction and the magnitude of the effect a certain variable will have on the
outcome of a case. If a MLE is negative, there is a decreased likelihood of a one for an
outcome. If it positive, there is an increased likelihood. Two of these coefficients, Martin
Quinn scores and gender of the justice, are highlighted on the table. Because I am looking at
if gender matters for Supreme Court decisions, controlling for ideology, I focused on these
two variables as these are two measures in the model that directly deal with the issues of
gender and ideology. As can be seen in the table, I have also controlled for other legal and
case issues. The logit model doesn't only look at two variables, like gender and outcome, it
controls for all the variables listed in the table. This gives me a much more complex and
accurate understanding of what variables really do have an effect and how much of an effect
they have and allows me to judge the effect a variable has on an outcome when controlling for
other variables. All the variables on the table are statistically significant under the accepted
standard error rate of .05, except for presence of women on the Court. That means that each
of the coefficients for the variables is considered accurate and statistically significant.
You need to examine what the actual coefficients are for Martin-Quinn scores and
justice gender and in order to know what they mean. The Martin-Quinn MLE is negative,
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which means that as a Martin-Quinn score increases and becomes more conservative,
meaning the justice is more conservative, there is a decreasing likelihood of a 1. This may be
what you would expect. As a justice becomes more conservative they are less likely to vote
for equality. This relationship also works the other way. That is, as a justice becomes more
liberal and their Martin-Quinn score decreases, there is an increasing likelihood that their
outcome will be a 1 and that they will vote for equality. The number for gender of the justice
is not negative, however, it is positive. As the value of the gender variable becomes more
positive, a 1 , there is an increasing likelihood that the outcome will also be positive, a 1. So if
a justice is a woman, there is an increased likelihood their outcome will be a 1, for equality.
This tells us that gender does matter and does affect the way in which justices make decisions,
even when controlling for ideology. This logit model and its coefficients does not only tell us
the direction of the effect, but also the magnitude of that effect, or the strength of the
independent variable's ability to impact the likelihood of the dependent variable, in this
research, the outcome of the case. For the magnitude, the positivity or negativity of the
coefficient does not matter, but the number itself does. The coefficient for Martin-Quinn
scores is .47, and the coefficient for gender, if we remove the negative sign, is 1 .35. This tells
me that gender has a larger effect on outcome, because the coefficient for gender is larger than
that of the coefficient for Martin-Quinn scores. This is a very interesting finding that
continues to support the representative voice model that gender and other factors all matter.
When we control for gender, ideology, and other factors, we discover that gender is actually
more important to the outcome of the case than the ideology of the justice. So while both
ideology and gender matter, which we can see from the coefficients and the fact that they are
statistically significant, gender matters more.
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Because these coefficients are so difficult to interpret substantively, I calculated a
serious of conditional effect probabilities. These tell us how much of an increase in the
probability of a decision for equality is there if a variable has a specific value. For example, if
the variable of gender has a value of 1, that is if a justice is female, the conditional effect
probabilities can tell us how much of an increase in the probability of a decision for equality
there will be. The conditional effect probabilities hold all other variables constant at their
means, which means that these other variables are being controlled for. In order to calculate
these conditional effect probabilities, you plug the coefficients from the logit model into the
Iogit equation and run with the values of the variables and run a serious of calculations that
allow you to eventually get the conditional effect probabilities. I focused on the top two
conditional effect probabilities found on Figure IO (see Appendix 9), which have been
highlighted. These are the two that deal most directly with gender effects, controlling for
ideology and other factors.
The first conditional effect probability on the table is Martin-Quinn scores. I used the
average Martin-Quinn scores of each of the two female justices for this analysis. These
scores are relatively moderate liberal and moderate conservative scores, for Justice Ginsberg
and Justice O'Connor respectively. It can be seen from the table that based on her Martin
Quinn Score, Justice Ginsberg has a 77.5% likelihood of voting for equality, when controlling
for other factors. With her Martin-Quinn score, Justice O'Connor only has a 52.0%
likelihood of voting for equality. But what is really interesting are the results for the
likelihood of equality votes for different genders, which is the next highlighted portion of the
table. If the variable of gender has a value of 1 , so if a person is a female, they have an
increased likelihood of voting for equality of 78.0%. This is a larger percentage than even
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that based on political ideology that the Martin-Quinn scores show. If ajustice is male, the
gender variable has a value of 0, they only have a 47.9% likelihood of voting for equality, and
are actually more likely to vote against it. This means that not only does gender have an
effect on the outcome of individual justice votes without being only the factor to matter, as in
the representative voice model, but it has a rather substantial effect.
It is clear from the statistical research that the gender of the justice does matter when
they are casting their individual vote. That is not to say, however, that gender is the only
variable that matters. The justices are complex people with many different intersecting
identities. They may be influenced by gender sometimes, political ideology other times, and
some other factor a third time. I cannot say for certain that an outcome was based solely on
gender; we simply don't have the ability to support that claim with valid research. However,
we can see that when compared with other factors, gender seems to matter more and to have a
larger impact on justices' decision making than even political ideology has.
Potential Concerns:

There are some potential problems with this research. First, is the number of women
examined. Unfortunately, due to the types of cases I analyzed and the lack of female
representation on the Court for hundreds of years, I was only able to study two female
justices. It would certainly be worthwhile to revisit this research when more women sit on the
Supreme Court. There is also a lack of other potential influencing factors being represented.
It is impossible to examine the effects of race when there is only one nonwhite justice (Justice
Thomas) represented in my data set. There are other potential influencing factors, such as
personal background, education, etc, that are not noted in this data. These factors would not,
on their own, discredit the finding that gender has an effect on decisions, but they could be
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additional factors that influence judicial decision making. The final issue I have identified
with this data analysis is the concept of coding outcomes as being "for equality" or "against
equality". Having read all 55 cases represented in the data set, I know just how complex these
legal issues are. A vote upholding discrimination, or a vote against it, cannot be so easily
coded as being "for" or ··against equality". When doing dichotomous coding, it is necessary
to break categories such as outcome down into l's and O's and there is something about the
nuances and complexities of Court opinions that gets lost in this representation of outcomes.
Martin and Pyle address this in their article Making a Difference: Women in the Judiciary.
They write "By using a dichotomous dependent variable, these studies force judicial decision
making into an unrealistic liberal/conservative, plaintiff/defendant, or women/men choice"
(Martin and Pyle 260).
Final Results and Recommendations:
This research has confirmed that gender does have an impact on judicial decisions
making and that the representative voice model best captures the way in which judges
undergo judicial decision-making. The genders of the justices sitting on the Supreme Court
matters and has an effect on the decision of the Court. In fact, the gender of the justices
matters more than any other factor we controlled for, including political ideology. This
means that my hypothesis was correct in part and incorrect. Gender matters, which is what I
initially hypothesized. In fact, it actually matters more than political ideology. My
hypothesis was that ideology, not gender, would matter more.
Moving forward, I believe this research should be revisited and continued. Other legal
topics should be studied. While this research can tell us that gender matters for decisions
dealing with sex discrimination and the equal protection clause, it cannot speak to other
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issues. In order to confirm either of the different voice or gendered-representative voice
theories, non-gendered legal topics should undergo this same research. Understanding how
gender impacts judicial decision making is a difficult thing. Judges are people and they think
in complex ways. However, this research needs to be continued so we can have a better
understand of how judicial decision making occurs.
Currently, there are only three women who sit on the Supreme Court. They are
expected to represent half of the population while only making up a third of the Court. These
women have experienced life differently that the male judges that sit next to them. They
understand the struggles and challenges that women face and this allows them to see the law
differently, at least around issues dealing with gender and discrimination. We may never be
able to know exactly why justices make the decisions that they make. But research like this
can bring us a little bit closer.
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Appendix I
Figure 2:
Date

Case Name

Cite

June 27,
1983
June 20,
1983

Lehr v.
Robertson
Newport
Shipbuilding
v. EEOC
Rostker v.
Goldberg

811 756
8241 1

June 25,
1 981

80251

Outcome N um. Justice
Maioritv
6
0

Num. Justice Num. Justice
Dissent
Concur
0

3

1

7

0

2

0

6

0

3
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Appendix II
Figure 3:
Case
Name
Geduldig
v. Aiello
Geduldig
v. Aiello
Geduldig
v. Aiello
Geduldig
v. Aiello
Geduldig
v. Aiello
Geduldig
v. Aiello
Geduldig
v. Aiello
Geduldig
v. Aiello
Geduldig
v. Aiello

0

Justice
Join C
0

Justice
Join M
0

1

1

0

0

1

1

0

0

0

0.421

0

3

0

0

0

White

0.61

0

3

0

0

0

Marshall

-1.533

1

1

1

0

0

Blackmun 1.058

0

3

0

0

0

1.146

0

3

0

0

0

Rehnquist 4.305

0

3

0

0

0

Justice
Name
Burger

MQ
Justice
2.183

Justice
Justice
Outcome Doctrine
3
0

Douglas

-6.619

1

Brennan

-2.034

Stewart

Powell
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Appendix III
Figure 4:

Justice O'Connor on the Court

No Women on the Court

Justices O'Connor and Ginsburg on Court

1-

Against Equality

- For Equality

Graphs of Outcome by Number of Women on Court
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Appendix IV
Figure 5:
Female Justices

Male Justices

1-

Against Equality

Graphs Gender , Outcome and Title IX
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- For Equality

Appendix V
Figure 6:
Female Justices

Male Justices

1-

Against Equality

Graphs by Outcome and Gender in Title VU Cases
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- For Equality

Appendix VI
Figure 7:
Male Justices

1-

Female Justices

Against Equality

- For Equality

Graphs by Justice Gender. Outcome and Equal Protection Clause
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Appendix VII
Figure 8:
Femaie Justices

Male Justices

1-

Against Equality

Graphs Outcomes and Gender

32

- For Equality
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Appendix VIII
Figure 9:

Table 1 : Multivariate Logit Model of
Gender and Preferences Controlling
for Legal and Court Factors (1 =For
Equality, 0-Against Equality)

Maximum
Likelihood
Estimator
(M.L.E.)

Independent Variables
Martin and Quinn Scores -0.47** *
Gender of Justice

1 .35***

Gender of Individual Party -0.47*
Title VII Case

1 .84***

Title IX Case 1 .03**
Equal Protection Case

Standard
Error
(S.E.)

0.06
0.50
0.26
0.36
0.43

0.77**

0.43

-0.21

0.32

Constant -0. 1 8

0.32

A Woman on US Supreme Court

Categorized Correctly =
Reduction of Error=
2 x LLR =
Chi-square=
Observations =
Mean of Dep. Variable =

33

72.4%
32.4%
-253.43
1 24.74***
469
0.59

Appendix IX
Figure 1 0:

Table 2: Conditional Effects Variable Value =
Holding other Variables Constant Predicted Probability of
at Their Means Supporting Sex Based
Equality
Independent Variables
-1.36 = 77.5%
+ 1 .08 = 52.0%

Martin and Quinn Scores
Justice Ginsburg and Justice
O'Connor
Gender of Justice
1=Female & O=Male

1 = 78.0%
0 = 47.9o/o

Gender of Individual Party
1 =Female & O=Male

1 = 44.8%
0 = 56.5%

Title VII Case
1 Yes & O=No

1 = 78.3%
O = 36.4%

Title IX Case
1 Yes & O No

1 = 7 1 .6%
0 = 47.6%

Equal Protection Case
1-Yes & O=No

1 = 60.1%
0 = 41 .8%

A Woman on US Supreme Court
l=Yes & O=No

1 = 48.2%
0 = 53.6%
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